法学院知识库

随着平台经济的发展，互联网平台经营者跨界经营已是互联网经济的常态。在跨界经营中，互联网平台在市场中扮演着平台规则制定者和平台内市场参与者的“双重角色”。互联网平台经营者的“双重角色”很容易让平台失去中立地位，互联网平台经营者通常会利用这种“双重角色”给自有产品和服务给予优惠待遇，即自我优待行为。互联网平台经营者实施自我优待行为可能会损害平台内经营者和消费者的利益，在特殊情形下可能会破坏互联网平台内市场的竞争格局。互联网平台经营者的自我优待行为具体表现为平台数据利用型自我优待、搜索偏见、平台费用歧视以及预安装和软件捆绑，有关自我优待行为的规则制度在法律法规、部门规章等层面都有体现。目前，我国互联网平台经营者自我优待行为的反垄断法规制困境主要有：自我优待行为反垄断法规制路径未明晰、自我优待行为相关市场和市场支配地位认定方法适用困难、自我优待行为事后监管具有滞后性以及自我优待行为规制原则和恢复竞争措施救济未明确。

关于自我优待行为反垄断法规制路径，有些自我优待行为类型可以通过按照传统滥用行为规制条款进行调整进而变通适用，对于超越传统滥用类型的自我优待行为可以适用《反垄断法》第二十二条的兜底条款进行规制。关于自我优待相关市场是市场支配地位的认定，除了市场份额这一参考因素外，反垄断执法机构在认定平台经营者的市场支配地位时还可以考虑平台内经营者和消费者的平台转换成本、平台服务的可替代性、平台的用户粘性和忠诚度以及平台处理的数据规模等要素。针对自我优待行为事后监管的滞后性，可以完善自我优待行为的事前规制体系，采取模糊化、兜底化的立法策略，为平台设立宏观的“平台中立”义务，加强互联网平台企业数据合规制度建设。在未来的反垄断法执法实践中，对互联网平台经营者的自我优待行为法律规制可以从重事后处罚转变为重事前监管。关于自我优待行为的规制原则和恢复竞争救济措施，反垄断法应当采用合理原则对自我优待行为进行规制，在自我优待行为的恢复竞争救济措施选择上，可以采取行为性救济措施和分离救济措施。

With the development of platform economy, cross-border operation of Internet platform operators has become the norm of Internet economy. In cross-border operation, the Internet platform plays a "dual role" in the market as the platform rule maker and the market participant within the platform. The "dual role" of Internet platform operators is easy to make the platform lose its neutral status, and Internet platform operators usually use this "dual role" to give preferential treatment to their own products and services, that is, self-preferential behavior. The self-preferential behavior of Internet platform operators may damage the interests of operators and consumers within the platform, and in special cases may destroy the competition order and competition pattern of the market within the Internet platform. There are many forms of self-preferential behavior of Internet platform operators, including platform data utilization self-preferential treatment, search bias, platform fee discrimination, pre-installation and software bundling. China's anti-monopoly law is still in the embryonic stage of regulating the self-preferential behavior of Internet platform operators, and the rules and systems related to self-preferential behavior are reflected in legal norms, normative documents, local regulations and other levels. At present, China's Internet platform operators' anti-monopoly regulation dilemma mainly includes: the anti-monopoly regulation path of self-preferential behavior is not clear, the application of self-preferential related market and market dominant position identification method is difficult, the post-supervision of self-preferential behavior is lagging, and the regulation principle of self-preferential behavior and the relief measures to restore competition are not clear.

As for the regulation path of anti-monopoly law for self-preferential behavior, some types of self-preferential treatment can be adapted by adjusting the regulation provisions of traditional abusive behavior, and self-preferential treatment beyond the traditional abuse type can be regulated by the backstop provisions stipulated in the second paragraph of 22nd of the Anti-Monopoly Law. Regarding the identification of market dominance by self-preferential treatment, in addition to the reference factor of market share, antitrust law enforcement agencies can also consider factors such as platform conversion costs of operators and consumers within the platform, substitutability of platform services, user stickiness and loyalty of the platform, and data scale processed by the platform when determining the market dominance of platform operators. In view of the lag in the post-supervision of self-preferential behavior, the pre-regulation system of self-preferential behavior can be improved, and the macro-level "platform neutrality" obligation can be set up for platforms by adopting vague and bottom-line legislative strategies, so as to strengthen the data compliance system construction of Internet platform enterprises. In the future practice of anti-monopoly law, the legal regulation of self-preferential behavior of Internet platform operators should adhere to the regulatory concept of pre-regulation and post-regulation. As for the regulation principle of self-preferential behavior and the relief measures to restore competition, the anti-monopoly law should adopt the reasonable principle to regulate the self-preferential behavior. In the choice of self-preferential behavior to restore competition relief measures, behavioral relief measures and separate relief measures can be adopted.