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家族企业是指资本或股份主要控制在一个家族手中，多由家族成员出任企业的主要领导职务的民营企业。在我国改革开放的四十多年间，家族企业作为推动我国经济发展的重要力量，随着时代不断发展进入发展成熟期，此时，传统家族制管理的局限性逐渐暴露出来，比如过度集权、观念陈旧、家族成员能力不能与时俱进等。如今，我国大部分家族企业都面临着两代人权利交接的局面，继续维持“家族化”与进行“去家族化”各有优缺，而股权激励作为一种长期的激励机制，是家族企业“去家族化”的重要工具，有利于规避委托代理成本产生的问题。
本文运用案例研究法，选择实施“去家族化”战略的中顺洁柔作为研究对象，中顺洁柔作为生活用纸行业的龙头企业，选择其作为研究对象来研究“去家族化”背景下的股权激励实施效果具有一定代表性，可以为未来实施“去家族化”的家族企业提供一定的参考意见。本文从委托代理理论的角度切入，围绕实施股权激励是为了减少代理成本的产生这一观点，基于双因素理论和企业生命周期理论，从市场反应、经济增加值、传统财务绩效以及非传统财务绩效这些方面着手，通过对中顺洁柔三次股权激励方案进行分析，从而分析中顺洁柔股权激励方案的有效性，总结出中顺洁柔在“去家族化”过程中股权激励计划的实施效果。在研究分析中顺洁柔实施股权激励计划的过程中，也发现了中顺洁柔在“去家族化”过程中存在的问题，比如激励指标较为单一，限制性股票解锁条件不够合理等，于是本文针对存在以上发现的中顺洁柔在股权激励过程中存在的问题提出了相应的解决措施以供参考。

Family enterprise refers to the private enterprise whose capital or shares are mainly controlled by a family, and most family members take the main leadership positions of the enterprise. During more than 40 years of reform and opening up in our country, family firm, as an important force promoting the economic development of our country, has entered a mature period with the development of The Times. At this time, the limitations of traditional family management gradually came to light, such as over-centralization, obsolete ideas, and the ability of family members not keeping pace with The Times. Nowadays, most family enterprises in our country are facing the situation of power handover between two generations, so there are advantages and disadvantages of continuing to maintain "family" and carrying out "de-family". Equity incentive, as a long-term incentive mechanism, is an important tool for "de-family" of family enterprises, which is conducive to avoiding the problems caused by principal-agent costs.
Using the case study method, this paper selects Zhongshun Jierou, which implements the "de-family" strategy, as the research object, and Zhongshun Jierou, a leading enterprise in the household paper industry, as the research object to study the implementation effect of equity incentive under the background of "de-family", which is representative to a certain extent, and can provide certain reference opinions for the future implementation of "de-family" family enterprises. From the perspective of principal-agent theory, this paper focuses on the idea that the implementation of equity incentive is to reduce agency costs. Based on the two-factor theory and the enterprise life cycle theory, this paper analyzes the three equity incentive schemes in terms of market response, economic added value, traditional financial performance and non-traditional financial performance. In this paper, the effectiveness of the equity incentive plan of Zhongshun Jierou is analyzed, and the implementation effect of the equity incentive plan in the process of "de-family" is summarized. In the process of studying and analyzing the implementation of the equity incentive plan of Zhongshun Jierou, the existing problems in the process of "de-family" of Zhongshun Jierou were also found, such as relatively single incentive indicators, unreasonable conditions for unlocking restricted shares, etc. Therefore, this paper proposed corresponding solutions to the problems in the process of equity incentive of Zhongshun Jierou found above for reference.